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COMMENTS
COERCED FATE: HOW NEGOTIATION
MODELS LEAD TO FALSE CONFESSIONS
KIERA JANZEN*
Police interrogators across the United States employ tactics that can
lead to coerced, often false, confessions. While police departments have
shifted away from physically coercive methods of interrogation,
psychologically coercive practices that utilize deceit have taken their place.
The reliability of confession evidence becomes a significant concern when
interrogators elicit confessions using these techniques.
Further
demonstrating the need for change in this realm, false confessions and
wrongful convictions place a financial burden on cities and taxpayers, who
foot the bill for settlements and damages resulting from these cases. The
current legal framework in the U.S. permits—by failing to explicitly
prohibit—these tactics, and police departments across the nation implement
and encourage officers to use them. The psychologically coercive methods
that police employ in interrogations share elements with methods that
parties often use in negotiations. To analyze why interrogators engage in
these practices and why they are successful in eliciting confessions, this
Comment examines psychologically coerced confessions under the
frameworks of three commonly used negotiation models: 1) the positionbased model, 2) the interest-based model, and 3) the core concerns model.
This analysis illustrates the need for systemic change to the laws applicable
to police interrogations, the widely used methods of interrogation, and the
inter-departmental practices that perpetuate coercive tactics. Specifically,
this Comment suggests a cross-institutional approach to reform in which
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lawmakers enact legislation that sets standards for interrogations, judges
prohibit evidence elicited through psychologically coercive tactics, and
police departments overhaul their interrogation practices and hold officers
accountable when they engage in psychologically coercive techniques.
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INTRODUCTION
“Patterns tell you that you have a bad orchard, not just a bad apple.”1
On November 30, 2008, a sixteen-year-old mother hysterically placed
a call to the police department in Worcester, Massachusetts to report that
her thirteen-month-old son, who suffered from respiratory problems, was

1 Sarah Macaraeg & Yana Kunichoff, ‘Nothing Happens to the Police’: Forced
Confessions Go Unpunished in Chicago, GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.theguard
ian.com/us-news/2016/jan/28/chicago-police-department-false-confessions-torture
[https://perma.cc/EU9H-88U7].
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not breathing.2 Nga Truong’s baby died at a nearby hospital less than
ninety minutes later.3 About twenty-four hours later, Truong confessed to
suffocating her infant son, Khyle, after Worcester police detectives
interrogated her for two hours.4 Following the confession, police arrested
Truong and charged her with murder as an adult.5 A judge denied Truong
bail and the right to attend Khyle’s funeral, then sent her to jail where she
spent the first four months on suicide watch and in solitary confinement.6
Without a trial, this period of detainment occurred while Truong was
supposed to be presumed innocent.7
A videotape of the interrogation shows Truong in an eight-by-ten foot
windowless interrogation room, repeatedly denying killing her son and
fighting back tears.8 Over the course of the two-hour interrogation, the
teenage mother stated thirteen times that she did not kill Khyle.9 However,
Sergeant Kevin Pageau and Detective John Doherty’s utilization of
interrogation elements from the commonly used Reid Technique—a multipart method of questioning designed to psychologically coerce subjects—
eventually led Truong to falsely confess.10
David Boeri, How a Teen’s Coerced Confession Set Her Free, NPR (Dec. 30, 2011,
3:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/144489360/how-a-teens-coerced-confession-sether-free [https://perma.cc/TND2-DZES].
3 Id.
4 Gretchen Gavett, A Rare Look at the Police Tactics That Can Lead to False
Confessions, PBS (Dec. 9, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-rare-look-atthe-police-tactics-that-can-lead-to-false-confessions/ [https://perma.cc/E2VM-LLVD].
5 Id.
6 Boeri, supra note 2; Brian Ballou et al., Teen Charged in Son’s Death Found Infant
Brother Dead, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 3, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massach
usetts/articles/2008/12/03/teen_charged_in_sons_death_found_infant_brother_dead/
[https://perma.cc/B424-VM9V].
7 Boeri, supra note 2; see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 724 (1976) (“In the criminal
justice system, this interest [in notice and an opportunity to be heard] is given concrete
protection through the presumption of innocence and the prohibition of state-imposed
punishment unless the State can demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt, at a public trial
with the attendant constitutional safeguards, that a particular individual has engaged in
proscribed criminal conduct.”).
8 Gavett, supra note 4.
9 David Boeri, Anatomy of a Bad Confession, Part 1, WBUR (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://legacy.wbur.org/2011/12/07/worcester-coerced-confession-i [https://perma.cc/DN5WFEFY].
10
Gavett, supra note 4; Boeri states as follows:
Towards the end of the interrogation, Pageau said, “All everyone’s waiting for
today is for you to admit to what you did so that we can start the process of getting
you some help, getting your brothers out of that house, and getting them in a better
home, where there’s a mom that gets up in the morning and takes care of them.”
Truong responded by inquiring further about what kind of help she could get, and
2
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Nearly three years later in 2011, the prosecutor dropped the case
against Truong, and she was released after spending two years and six
months in jail.11 Before the prosecutor dropped the charges, Worcester
Superior Court Judge Janet Kenton-Walker approved a motion to suppress
all statements that Truong made to the detectives over the course of her
interrogation.12 Further, in February 2011, the judge ruled that the
confession was inadmissible.13 Judge Kenton-Walker described Truong as
“a frightened, meek, emotionally compromised teenager who never
understood the implications of her statements.”14 Ultimately, she deemed
the girl’s statements involuntary for two reasons: the interrogators violated
procedure by failing to extend her the Miranda rights required for juveniles,
and they used false statements and deception to illicit the confession.15 The
prosecutor had no other evidence against Truong—no DNA evidence, no
eyewitness testimony, no prior convictions, and no circumstantial
evidence—and was forced to drop the case.16 In 2016, the City of
Worcester reached a settlement with Truong for $2.1 million, which ended
her suit against the city for civil rights violations, malicious prosecution,
false arrest, and false imprisonment.17
Judge Kenton-Walker found Truong’s statements to be involuntary
because Pageau and Doherty’s collective use of deceit, false statements,
false promises, and trickery coerced Truong to falsely confess.18 However,
almost all of the individual techniques that the interrogators employed were

the officers told her that while they could not promise anything, her confession
would grant her leniency in the juvenile system. To this, Truong whispered, “Do I
have to say it?”, and after Pageau replied that she did, Truong sobbed for one full
minute before stating, “I smothered Khyle.”
Boeri, supra note 9.
11 Boeri, supra note 2; Gavett, supra note 4.
12 Gavett, supra note 4.
13 Boeri, supra note 2.
14 Id; see also David Boeri, Woman in Tossed-Out Confession Gets $2.1M Settlement
from
Worcester,
WBUR
(June
30,
2016),
http://www.wbur.org/all-thingsconsidered/2016/06/30/nga-truong-worcester-settlement [https://perma.cc/U4CM-WCYT]
(noting that after Judge Kenton-Walker watched the interrogation video, she stated, “With
notable naivete, Nga believed what the officers told her. . . . All she wanted to know was
whether she and her brothers would now be able to go to a foster home.”).
15 Boeri, supra note 2.
16 Id.
17 Boeri, supra note 14.
18 Boeri, supra note 2; Gavett, supra note 4.
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legal.19 Interrogations are inherently stressful and coercive by nature
because authority figures use both intimidation and leverage.20 Police
departments no longer engage in the brutal physical torture tactics, often
referred to as “the third degree,” that were commonplace prior to the
Supreme Court’s 1936 prohibition on such methods in Brown v.
Mississippi.21 However, the current U.S. legal framework permits many
psychologically coercive techniques that police interrogators employ.22
Interrogators design and employ psychologically coercive tactics to
elicit confessions in a manner similar to formerly used physical torture
techniques. One definition of psychologically coercive police tactics is
“coercive police methods that sequentially manipulate a suspect’s
perception of the situation, expectations for the future, and motivation to
shift from denial to admission.”23 These tactics can result in truthful
confessions and the genuine administration of justice, but numerous cases
demonstrate that they frequently lead to false confessions and wrongful
convictions of innocent individuals who were psychologically coerced to
profess guilt to crimes that they did not commit.24
The psychologically coercive tactics used by interrogators like Pageau
and Doherty, and the confessions they produce, raise the issue of reliability
throughout the legal process, from interrogation to potential conviction.25
Most jurors cannot fathom confessing to a crime that they did not commit.26
People unfamiliar with interrogation tactics struggle to imagine why
19 Boeri, supra note 2. Note that Judge Kenton-Walker did not rule on the permissibility
of any of the individual tactics that Pageau and Doherty used, but found that their collective
use of these techniques throughout Truong’s interrogation coerced her to confess.
20 Frances E. Chapman, Coerced Internalized False Confessions and Police
Interrogations: The Power of Coercion, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 159, 164 (2013).
21 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Boeri, supra note 9; but see, e.g.,
Macaraeg & Kunichoff, supra note 1 (discussing the Chicago Police Department’s use of
electric shock, suffocation, beating, and mock executions to coerce confessions under
detective and commander Jon Burge from the 1970s through early 1990s).
22 Gavett, supra note 4.
23 Chapman, supra note 20, at 163–64.
24 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051,
1060 (2010) (noting that scholars and researchers have identified at least 250 cases involving
false confessions since the 1990s). See also Richard Leo, Police Interrogations, False
Confessions, and Alleged Child Abuse Cases, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 693, 698–700
(2017) (noting that “DNA cases consistently show fifteen to twenty-five percent false
confessions”, and that this may just be the “tip of the iceberg” because false confessions are
“a phenomenon that is largely invisible.”).
25 Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.injusticeinperugia.org/AmericanPsychologistSaulKassin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9KQ-KXVB].
26 Id.
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someone would act against her own interests by admitting guilt when she is
truly innocent.27 Consequently, people tend to view any confession,
regardless of its validity, with an underlying presumption of guilt.28 As a
result, “[t]he real trial is what occurs in the interrogation room.”29 Existing
laws and their enforcement must shift to prohibit psychologically coercive
practices that lead to unreliable confessions because such confessions carry
presuppositions of guilt that impair the administration of justice throughout
the entirety of a case.
False confessions not only impair the administration of justice, they
also cost cities and taxpayers millions of dollars.30 As in Truong’s case,
courts and juries award millions of dollars in settlements and damages to
individuals implicated in false confession cases.31 In addition to the pursuit
of true justice, police departments have financial incentives to change their
internal interrogation practices to avoid costly payouts for cities and their
taxpayers.
The case of Nga Truong is hardly an isolated example of the use of
psychologically coercive tactics leading to a false confession and wrongful
conviction. In the U.S., 40 of the first 250 people exonerated based on
DNA evidence had falsely confessed.32 The development of DNA testing
has revealed the scope of the issue of false confessions and wrongful
27 Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW. 332, 333 (2009) (noting that “[M]ost people do not know
what occurs during police interrogations, and . . . they wrongly assume that individuals do
not act against their self-interest or engage in self-destructive behavior, such as falsely
confessing to a crime they did not commit.”).
28 Leo, supra note 24, at 700.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Crimesider Staff, How Chicago racked up a $662 million police misconduct
bill, CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-chicago-racked-up-a662-million-police-misconduct-bill/ [https://perma.cc/U2AZ-9NSD] (noting that from 2004
to 2016, Chicago taxpayers paid $662 million for police misconduct, largely attributable to
cases of false confessions and wrongful convictions).
31 See, e.g., Fran Spielman, ‘Englewood Four,’ coerced into confessions, to get $31M
settlement, CHI. SUN TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/englewoodfour-31-million-settlement-tortured-false-confession-exonerated/
[https://perma.cc/Z7LP8YCV] (noting a $31 million settlement to be paid by Chicago taxpayers to four men in a
rape and murder false confession case); Frank Green, Former U.S. attorney on Norfolk Four
rape, murder case: ‘It’s the worst miscarriage of justice I’ve experienced in my 40 years as
a lawyer’, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH (Feb. 23, 2018), http:// www.richmond.com
/news/local/crime/former-u-s-attorney-on-norfolk-four-rape-murder-case/article_fecc026b0175-546c-a7f7-7074bc760549.html [https://perma.cc/D497-7GZ7] (noting a $41 million
verdict in New York, a $20 million settlement in Illinois, an $18 million settlement in
Washington, D.C., a $16 million verdict in Missouri, and a $13.2 million verdict in Ohio).
32 Garrett, supra note 24.
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convictions.33 Post-conviction DNA tests prove that many people who
falsely confessed to crimes could not have been the true perpetrators of
those crimes.34 In turn, psychologists and social scientists have studied the
psychological impacts of coercive interrogation tactics in attempts to
determine how they are applied and why they lead to confessions, whether
false or not.35
Although psychologists and social scientists have provided insight into
how coercive interrogation methods impact interrogation subjects,
examining psychologically coercive police interrogations under the
frameworks of several of the most commonly-used negotiation models
provides further insight into the actions and motivations of both
interrogation subjects and interrogators.
This Comment analyzes
psychologically coercive interrogations under the position-based
negotiation model, the interest-based model,36 and the five core concerns
presented by Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro in their book, Beyond
Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate.37 This analysis clarifies
common misconceptions surrounding confession evidence by illustrating
how interrogators get people to confess, why people confess to crimes that
they did not commit, and what motivates police departments to engage in
systematic use of these techniques. This examination further demonstrates
that the current legal framework applicable to interrogations gives police
broad leeway to employ tactics that have coercive effects akin to traditional
physical torture methods. This legal framework, in combination with lack
of officer and department accountability and failure to address problematic
interrogation practices at a systemic level, creates a bad orchard where
innocent people are psychologically coerced to falsely confess.
The remainder of this Comment will unfold in several parts. Part I
examines the development of the current legal framework that governs
police interrogations and illustrates how it allows psychologically coercive
practices to persist. Part II addresses coercive interrogation tactics and the
psychological and social science research on coerced confessions, which
demonstrates how these techniques lead to confessions. Part III explains
33 Saul
M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 L. HUM. BEHAV. (2009), http:// web.williams.edu/ Psychology/
Faculty/ Kassin/ files/White%20Paper%20-%20LHB%20(2010).pdf [https://perma.cc/V89
T-G6VM] [hereinafter Police-Induced Confessions White Paper].
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., Leo, supra note 27; Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33.
36 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
37 ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU
NEGOTIATE (2005).
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the position-based, interest-based, and core concerns negotiation models
and applies each model to the interrogation of Nga Truong to show how
police can exploit elements from these negotiation models to coerce
interrogation subjects to confess. Part IV then reflects on the insights
gained from examining police interrogations under the negotiation model
framework and proposes potential solutions to the problem of
psychologically coercive interrogation practices.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERROGATIONS

A. HISTORICAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF COERCION

Officials have engaged in widespread torture as a means of eliciting
confessions throughout history. Centuries ago in the Roman Republic,
officials regularly used physical torture on slaves to extract confessions and
augment testimony.38 In the later period of the Roman Empire, officials
expanded confessional torture policies to citizens as well as slaves, and
used these techniques to confirm evidence in cases involving those accused
of “grave crimes.”39 Similarly in the U.S., for much of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, “the state had ample means to obtain incriminatory
evidence,” and sheriffs, constables, night watchmen, and community
members were responsible for crime control.40 However, large-scale
professional police departments developed in the late nineteenth century
and took on responsibility for criminal investigations and interrogations.41
The lack of law governing interrogations allowed officers to engage in
“third degree” methods of physical and mental torture similar to ancient
Roman techniques.42 Commonly employed third-degree techniques against
interrogation subjects included: beating, kicking, mauling, holding a
suspect’s head under water, burning with cigars or pokers, extended solitary
confinement, sleep and food deprivation, shining blinding lights in faces,

38 Tracey Maclin, A Comprehensive Analysis of the History of Interrogation Law, With
Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1387, 1397–98 (2015).
39 Sarah Bond, Torture Has Never Been An Effective Means of Information Gathering –
Just Ask the Romans, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2017, 8:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/drsarahbond/2017/01/28/torture-has-never-been-an-effective-means-of-informationgathering-just-ask-the-romans/#1274fe89367c [https://perma.cc/RSD9-8JZW].
40 Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J.
CRIM. L 309, 322–23 (1998).
41 Id.
42 Id.; Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6.

2019]

COERCED FATE

79

coercive questioning, threats, and promises related to leniency.43 Police
interrogators relied on these types of tactics through the 1930s.44 In 1929,
President Herbert Hoover established the Wickersham Commission (also
known as the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement),
a committee which investigated and analyzed issues in law enforcement.45
In its 1931 report, the Commission condemned interrogators’ use of thirddegree methods and found that they led to coerced false confessions.46
Shortly after the Wickersham Commission’s 1931 report, the Supreme
Court, in 1936, condemned interrogators’ use of physical abuse to elicit
confessions in Brown v. Mississippi.47 In Brown, police arrested a suspect,
hung him by a rope from a tree limb, and later tied him to the tree, where
they whipped him while he proclaimed his innocence.48 Police eventually
released the man, but rearrested him days later, severely whipped him
again, and told him the whipping would continue until he confessed.49 The
suspect did confess and he was convicted based on this confession, but the
Supreme Court reversed his conviction, stating that a trial “is a mere
pretense where the state authorities have contrived a conviction resting
solely upon confessions obtained by violence.”50 The Court further held
that in order to comport with due process, state action must be “consistent
with fundamental principles of liberty and justice”.51
As a result of the Wickersham Commission’s report and the Supreme
Court holding in Brown that “[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be
substituted for the witness stand,”52 interrogators began to move away from

43

Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6; Maclin, supra note 38,
at 1391; Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 909 (2004).
44 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6.
45 Maclin, supra note 38, at 1391; John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Herbert Hoover:
Remarks at the First Meeting of the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210035
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CNV2-Z38H].
46 Id.
47 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 12.
48 297 U.S. at 281.
49 Id. at 281–82.
50 Id. at 284, 286.
51 Id. at 286 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)); Russell L.
Weaver, Reliability, Justice, and Confessions: The Essential Paradox, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
179, 182–83 (2010).
52 297 U.S. at 286; see also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (holding that
admission of a confession was improper because it was elicited by means of a brutal
interrogation).
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third-degree tactics.53 Instead, interrogators increasingly developed and
relied on psychological interrogation methods to increase subjects’ anxiety
and stress and exploit their emotions.54 Police interrogators have developed
a “single-minded purpose of interrogation . . . to elicit incriminating
statements” because confession evidence can lead to convictions,55 and
police performance is often measured by the number of convictions they
obtain, and subsequently the number of crimes they clear.56 These
performance measures do not necessarily consider whether guilty or
innocent people are convicted.57 Consequently, interrogators have relied on
these psychological interrogation methods to obtain confessions from
suspects by any means necessary.
Current federal and state laws allow—or at least fail to explicitly
prohibit—interrogators to employ psychologically coercive tactics that lead
innocent people to falsely confess to crimes. The American criminal justice
system has grappled with police-induced false confessions since the late
nineteenth century.58 An 1819 case that is widely regarded as the first
wrongful conviction case in the United States involved a false confession.59
In 1897, the Supreme Court ruled in Bram v. United States that under the
Fifth Amendment, any confession “extracted by any sort of threats or
violence . . . obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,
[or] by the exertion of any improper influence” is invalid.60 However, the
Court did not deem the Fifth Amendment “privilege against compelled selfincrimination” to be a “fundamental” right, and it was thus only applicable
to federal criminal trials and not state criminal trials, which constitute the
vast majority of criminal trials.61 The Supreme Court did not extend (via
the Fourteenth Amendment) this privilege to the states until Malloy v.

53

Drizin & Leo, supra note 43, at 909–10.
Id.; Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6.
55 Id.
56 Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for
False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126, 145 (2013), https://doi.org/
10.1080/0731129X.2013.817070 [https://perma.cc/R8SB-76T8].
57 Id. at 146.
58 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6.
59 Robert J. Norris & Allison D. Redlich, Seeking Justice, Compromising Truth?
Criminal Admissions and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1005, 1015–16 (2014)
(noting the incident of the first wrongful conviction in the U.S. in 1819).
60 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897).
61 Id. at 542; Marc L. Waite, Reining in “Knock and Talk” Investigations: Using
Missouri v. Seibert to Curtail an End-Run Around the Fourth Amendment, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1335, 1354 (2007).
54
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Hogan in 1964.62 This meant that for decades, suspects in state criminal
trials could not invoke the Fifth Amendment protection to exclude coerced
confessions.63
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MODERN INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

Unlike the explicit prohibition of physical torture in interrogations in
Brown, the law regarding psychologically coercive and deceptive
interrogation practices is “far less condemnatory,” providing broad leeway
to police in the interrogation room.64 Prior to the Supreme Court’s
substantive discussion of the Fifth Amendment’s application to
interrogations and psychological techniques applied in police questioning in
Miranda v. Arizona,65 the Court noted in several cases that interrogators
engaging in deceptive tactics can cause involuntary confessions.66 For
example, Leyra v. Denno involved a psychiatrist, who, working with police,
impersonated a general medical practitioner and posed “subtle and
suggestive questions . . . to induce [the] petitioner to admit his guilt.”67 The
Supreme Court deemed the resulting confession involuntary because of the
psychiatrist’s deception and the police’s use of other mentally and
emotionally taxing tactics.68 However, the Court did not hold that coercive
tactics of this nature on their own could presumptively disqualify a
confession on voluntariness grounds.69 Thus, despite discussion of
psychological interrogation practices, prior to Miranda, the Court did not
rule on the legality of the use of coercive practices in general, and focused
instead on the context of individual cases. Nonetheless, interrogation
jurisprudence further developed in the 1960s when the Supreme Court
guaranteed suspects in state criminal proceedings the Fifth Amendment’s
“privilege against self-incrimination” through the Fourteenth Amendment
in Malloy,70 and the Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel
applied during police interrogations in Escobedo v. Illinois.71
62

378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964); Waite, supra note 61, at 1354.
Id.
64 See generally 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see Police-Induced Confessions White Paper,
supra note 33, at 12.
65 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 12.
67 347 U.S. 556, 559 (1954).
68 Id. at 561; see also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323–24 (1959) (holding a
confession involuntary where the interrogator exploited his preexisting friendship with the
suspect to elicit the confession).
69 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 12.
70 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
71 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964).
63

82

JANZEN

[Vol. 109

Scholars, including Saul M. Kassin, Steven A. Drizin, and Thomas
Grisso, view Miranda as a significant step in the Court seeking to prevent
police interrogations from leading to coerced, false confessions.72
In 1966, the Miranda Court expressed concern about instances where
“the inherently threatening power of the police” was leveraged against the
lesser powers of interrogation subjects, and theorized that the process of
questioning was coercive due to its power dynamic structure alone.73 Here,
however, the Court again failed to explicitly outlaw psychologically
coercive interrogation tactics.74 In a 5–4 decision, the Court ruled that the
Fifth Amendment mandated a fundamental privilege for interrogation
subjects to receive warnings about their rights to remain silent, that
anything they do or say can and will be used against them, information
about availability of legal counsel, and an opportunity to waive those rights
before the interrogation.75 Further, “unless and until such warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as
a result of the interrogation can be used against [the defendant].”76
Despite the theoretical increase in protections against coerced
confessions for interrogation subjects that Miranda offered, federal and
state courts today largely permit coercive police interrogation conduct as
long as police provide the Miranda warnings and the suspects waive their
rights.77 Whether innocent or not, more than 80% of suspects waive their
Miranda rights with the intent of seeming cooperative to police.78
Consequently, “Miranda has not proven to be a panacea to the problem of
false confessions.”79 Research suggests that merely satisfying the Miranda
72 See Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 7 (describing Miranda
as “[o]ne of the U.S. legal system’s greatest efforts to protect suspects from conditions that
might produce involuntary and unreliable confessions”).
73 Id.; Maclin, supra note 38, at 1399.
74 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 13 (explaining that while
the Court “discussed the use of trickery and deception and noted that the deceptive tactics
recommended in standard interrogation manuals fostered a coercive environment . . . [it] did
not specifically prohibit such tactics,” but gave suspects rights that could stop an
interrogation instead).
75 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 476, 479 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 41 (extending similar rights and procedures to juveniles).
76 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
77 Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After
Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (Or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U.
L. REV. 1157, 1165–67 (2017).
78 Douglas Starr, Do police interrogation techniques produce false confessions?, THE
NEW YORKER (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/theinterview-7 [https://perma.cc/T55U-SZCS].
79 Weaver, supra note 51, at 184.
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requirements is insufficient to prevent interrogators from coercing innocent
people to falsely confess.80 Most innocent suspects relinquish their rights
before the accusations begin in an interrogation, and are unlikely to invoke
their rights to end the questioning as interrogators increase pressure and
employ coercive tactics.81 Suspects give up their rights in some instances
because police administer the warning poorly or improperly, and in doing
so, “undercu[t] its significance and impact.”82 In addition, significant issues
remain even if the Miranda rights are properly extended.83 Suspects may
be nervous, misunderstand the implications of their actions, or feel
concerned about the consequences of talking to police, and might therefore
waive their rights without much consideration of the consequences.84
While these are potential issues for all interrogation subjects, according to
Christopher Slobogin, “psychological characteristics of [some] supect[s]
make the warnings irrelevant.”85 In particular, adults with mental
disabilities and children under the age of sixteen tend to misunderstand the
warnings or their implications.86
Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has been more deferential toward
police departments’ interrogation practices, and has permitted, through
explicit rulings as well as vague interpretations and statements about the
law, the continued use of deceptive and coercive tactics.87 Presently, police
can “lie about anything in the interrogation room so long as it does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process voluntariness standard.”88
For instance, in Frazier v. Cupp, interrogators falsely told the suspect that a
person he was with at the time of the crime had confessed to it.89 The Court
held that while deceptive tactics of this nature should be considered when
assessing the voluntariness of a confession, they were insufficient on their
own “to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.”90 This
80

See Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 7–9.
Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 1116–17 (1997).
82 Weaver, supra note 51, at 185.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Slobogin, supra note 77, at 1176.
86 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 8.
87 Id. at 12.
88 Leo, supra note 24, at 717.
89 394 U.S. 731, 737–38 (1969).
90 Id. at 739; see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 496–97 (1977) (holding that
an “officer’s false statement about having discovered [the suspect’s] fingerprints at the
scene” was insufficient by itself to make the confession inadmissible); State v. Nightingale,
58 A.3d 1057, 1061, 1068–69 (Me. 2012) (holding that interrogators’ false suggestions that
81
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case “has been interpreted by police and the courts as a green light to
deception.”91
Additionally, in the context of an interrogation, it is legal for the police
to “misrepresen[t] the strength of the state’s case to the suspect.”92 Police
are further permitted to deceptively befriend suspects in an effort to gain
their trust and get information from them. 93 According to case law, police
are not explicitly prohibited from engaging in minimization, or
“downplaying the moral consequences of the crime without mentioning the
legal ones.”94 Minimization, part of the commonly-used Reid Technique,
involves interrogators expressing sympathy to the suspect, minimizing the
offense, suggesting that they would act in a similar way, and offering
various explanations for the crime.95
For example, in a murder
interrogation, police using minimization tactics might suggest to the suspect
“that the murder was spontaneous, provoked, peer-pressured, or accidental
rather than the work of a cold-blooded premeditated killer.”96 Minimization
is intended to provide interrogation subjects with moral justifications and
excuses for the alleged crime, and when a person is under extreme pressure
and experiencing feelings of desperation and hopelessness, he or she may
consequently feel that confessing is a tenable alternative or escape.97
In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has also issued rulings that
changed some procedures surrounding interrogation jurisprudence. In
1991, the Court held in Arizona v. Fulminante that the admission of an
involuntary confession was subject to harmless error analysis, rather than
“trigger[ing] a rule of ‘automatic reversal.’”98 This means that in cases
where a coerced confession was allowed into evidence, instead of the case
being automatically reversed, the appellate court will consider the
admittance of the confession as “harmless error” and look beyond the
they had compromising DNA evidence and satellite images of the suspect’s car at the crime
scene did not make the confession inadmissible).
91 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 13.
92 Miller W. Shealy, Jr., The Hunting of Man: Lies, Damn Lies, and Police
Interrogations, 4 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 21, 35 (2014); see Bobby v. Dixon,
565 U.S. 23 (2011).
93 Shealy, Jr., supra note 92, at 29.
94 Starr, supra note 78; see, e.g., Frazier, 394 U.S. 731, 738–39 (1969) (an interrogator’s
suggestion that the victim initiated the fight “by making homosexual advances” did not
make the confession inadmissible).
95 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 12.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of
Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 153 (1991).
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procedural error to determine if it affected how jurors evaluated the case. 99
If the court determines that the error did not prejudice jurors’ evaluation of
the case, then it will not reverse the case based on the error.100 Another
shift in the law came in 2000 with the Court’s decision in Dickerson v.
United States.101 The Dickerson Court changed the approach of examining
the reliability of confessions to “a deferential voluntariness test examining
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of a confession.”102 This new test
involves an examination of “the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation,”103 and almost always results in courts finding
confessions to be voluntary.104
C. LEGAL LIMITS ON MODERN INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

Regardless of the interrogation legal framework’s vagueness and the
subsequent broad authority granted to police interrogators, lower courts
have defined some limits to this power and set some guidelines for what is
improperly coercive. Several state courts, primarily out of fear that such
evidence will be presented in court, ruled that police cannot fabricate
evidence.105 However, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
yet to provide substantive guidance on this issue.106 Further, courts
generally do not approve of police interrogators’ misrepresentation of legal
rights,107 and relatedly, interrogation techniques cannot involve negotiating
99

Ogletree, Jr., supra note 98, at 156–57.
Id. at 157.
101 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
102 Id. at 444; Garrett, supra note 24, at 1058.
103 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434.
104 Garrett, supra note 24, at 1058.
105 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 13; see, e.g., State v.
Cayward, 552 So.2d 971, 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a defendant’s
confession was inadmissible where police fabricated an incriminating crime lab report);
State v. Chirokovskcic, 373 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding
that suspect’s statements had to be suppressed where police detectives fabricated a
laboratory report placing the suspect’s DNA at the crime scene).
106 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 13; see also Miriam S.
Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of
Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 805 (2006) (“Few federal
courts have circumscribed the use of specific deceptive interrogation techniques, and only in
rare cases have federal courts deemed deceptive interrogation practices coercive.”).
107 Cynthia J. Najdowski & Catherine L. Bonventre, Deception in the interrogation
room, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2014), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/05/jn [https://perm
a.cc/2XDJ-ZQ2F]; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 257 (Mass. 2012)
(holding that the defendant’s statements should have been suppressed as involuntary
partially because of police “mischaracteriz[ation] [of] the law of murder, felony-murder, and
accident).
100
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or promising legal relief to suspects.108 Police are additionally forbidden
from making threats of “physical force or other serious harm” against an
interrogation subject’s family.109
D. PRACTICES THAT FURTHER THE MODERN INTERROGATION LEGAL
FRAMEWORK

Outside of the legal framework, other systemic practices perpetuate
improperly coercive interrogation tactics. Namely, police interrogators who
employ improper coercive tactics largely go unpunished and are rarely held
accountable for their misconduct.110 In fact, officers are sometimes
rewarded in these cases. For example, Chicago police officer Francis
Valadez has been accused of coercing six false murder confessions—
including some by men who have either been exonerated, acquitted, or had
their charges dropped; Valadez was also accused of battery and assault
during his time with the Chicago Police Department.111 Valadez has been
promoted multiple times since these incidents and has received 131 awards
during his time on the force.112 Additionally, numerous officers involved in
the Burge Police Torture Scandal in Chicago in the 1970s through 1990s
were “promoted, commended, or allowed to retire with full benefits,” and
recommendations for discipline for several officers were dismissed.113
Deborah Jacobs, a law enforcement expert and former Executive Director
of the New Jersey American Civil Liberties Union, commented on this
systemic issue that, “[w]hen officers see other officers’ misconduct
tolerated—or even rewarded—it not only sends a message that brutal
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Slobogin, supra note 77, at 1172.
Id. at 1165–66; see Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 532 (1963) (holding that a
confession resulting from interrogators’ threat to take defendant’s children away was
invalid); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 535–36 (1961) (holding a confession was
involuntary where police threatened to arrest suspect’s wife).
110 See, e.g., Macaraeg & Kunichoff, supra note 1 (discussing the lack of legal
accountability for Chicago police officers accused of “coercing at least eleven false
confessions for murder” despite the accusers being exonerated, acquitted, or having their
criminal charges dropped).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Human
Rights Watch, Chicago: Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo53.htm#P1623404619 [https://perma.cc/B
K6U-JLXV] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (explaining the Burge Torture scandal, in which
Chicago Police Commander Jon Burge and other Chicago officers and detectives physically
and psychologically tortured—via severe beatings, electric shock, and other abusive
methods—at least 65 individuals between 1972 and 1991).
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misconduct is allowed, but that it’s the only way to succeed or survive
within the department’s culture.”114
II.

COERCIVE PRACTICES AND CONFESSIONS

A. DEFINITION OF FALSE CONFESSIONS

A false confession is defined as an admission of guilt followed by a
factual description of a crime that the individual confessing did not actually
commit.115 The factual descriptions often include specific details about
how and why the confessor allegedly committed the crime.116 The state of
Illinois and other organizations do not keep records of these types of
confessions, so they can be challenging to discover and track.117 However,
a number of factors may lead a court to classify a confession as false,
including: (1) evidence that the crime did not occur, (2) evidence
demonstrating that it was a physical impossibility for the false confessor to
have committed the crime, (3) the person who actually committed the crime
coming forward, or (4) DNA results or other scientific evidence proving the
confessor’s innocence.118 Scholars explain that the psychologically
coercive tactics that police employ involve deception and manipulation of a
suspect’s perception of the situation and their future expectations, which
shift the interrogation subjects’ motivations from denial to admission, and
can ultimately produce false confessions.119 Since around 80% of criminal
cases involve a confession,120 the issues of psychologically coercive tactics
and false confessions highly impact the criminal justice system’s search for
truth and administration of justice.
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFESSION EVIDENCE

It is difficult for most people, particularly those unfamiliar with
coercive interrogation methods, to imagine confessing to a crime that they
did not commit.121 In his 1923 evidence treatise, John Henry Wigmore
stated, “false confessions were ‘scarcely conceivable’ and ‘of the rarest
114

Macaraeg & Kunichoff, supra note 1.
Leo, supra note 27, at 333.
116 Kassin, supra note 25.
117 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 5.
118 Id.
119 Chapman, supra note 20, at 163–64.
120 Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, Three-Dimensional Model for the Use of Expert
Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False Confession Defenses Before the Trier of
Fact, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 783, 797 (2003).
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occurrence’, and that ‘[n]o trustworthy figures of authenticated instances
exist.’”122 The scientific and psychological research and publications
regarding the potential effects of police interrogations, false confessions,
and coercive practices are not common knowledge.123 Further, most people
have difficulty comprehending why a person would act counterintuitively to
his or her self-interest by confessing to something that he or she did not
do.124
Even some people who are familiar with coercive police
interrogation tactics think that interrogators need to employ these methods
to obtain valid confessions and that the tactics are unlikely to lead to false
statements.125 Thus, in general, people conclude that confessions obtained
by police interrogators are valid admissions of guilt.126 The public fails to
recognize the scope and significance of coerced confessions, which can
lead jurors to assign confession evidence a disproportionate amount of
weight.127 Experiments with mock jurors have demonstrated that people
view confession evidence as more important than other types of evidence,
even when told that that evidence was coerced, that other evidence
contradicts it, or that it should be disregarded.128 Thus, regardless of what
evidence and testimony may emerge during a trial, if an individual
confessed (falsely or not) to a crime, such a confession can seal a
defendant’s fate in the minds of jurors.
Not only does confession evidence significantly affect jurors’
perceptions of innocence, but it also persuades police, prosecutors, and
judges.129 According to scholars Richard J. Ofshe and Richard Leo, “[a]
confession—whether true or false—is arguably the most damaging
evidence the government can present in a trial.”130 Following a confession,
police usually arrest the confessor, curtail their investigation, and
subsequently close the case.131 This happens regardless of whether
interrogators employed questionable coercive tactics, there are
122

Garrett, supra note 24, at 1052.
Leo, supra note 24, at 701.
124 Leo, supra note 27, at 333.
125 Najdowski & Bonventre, supra note 107; see also Kassin, supra note 25, at 5
(“although people recognize the coerciveness of certain interrogation tactics, they do not
perceive an accompanying risk of false confessions”); Maclin, supra note 38, at 1389
(“Perhaps because of their fear of crime and the uncomplicated objective of police
interrogation, Americans are sometimes conflicted about police interrogation.”).
126 Leo, supra note 24, at 701.
127 Id. at 700.
128 Id. at 701.
129 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 81, at 983–84.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 984.
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inconsistencies in statements, or contradictory evidence exists.132 This
prompts a series of further issues for confessors, such as difficulties
convincing others of their innocence in recantations post-confession, the
increased likelihood that prosecutors will charge them severely, and greater
difficulty making bail.133 Further, confessions can negatively influence the
perspectives of witnesses and experts,134 corrupt the framing of other
evidence,135 and “set in motion a virtually irrefutable presumption of guilt
among . . . the media, the public, and lay jurors.”136
C. THE REID TECHNIQUE137

Many U.S. police departments base their interrogation practices on the
Reid Technique.138 John E. Reid, a Chicago policeman turned consultant
and polygraph expert, and Fred Inbau, a Northwestern Law professor,
studied polygraphs and psychology to develop the Reid Technique in the
1940s and published the first explanatory manual in 1962.139 The technique
unfolds in several parts that shift between interrogators offering their
subject positive and negative incentives.140 The first step of the technique,
sometimes referred to as the behavior analysis interview, involves probing
the suspect, who is usually isolated in a small room, 141 with basic, nonthreatening questions to watch for any indications of anxiety.142 If the
interrogator feels that the suspect’s body language and answers indicate he
or she is lying, the questioner begins the interrogation phase of the
technique.143 This step largely entails the maximization tactics of insisting
(usually with false or valid claims to evidence) that the subject committed
the crime, preventing the suspect from denying accusations, and following
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Id.
134 Kassin, supra note 25.
135 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 23.
136 Drizin & Leo, supra note 43, at 922.
137 In 1947, the Northwestern University School of Law’s Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology published an article about the Reid Technique when it was in its developmental
stages. John E. Reid, A Revised Questioning Technique in Lie-Detection Tests, 37 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 542 (1947).
138 See Starr, supra note 78 (“John E. Reid & Associates, Inc. trains more interrogators
than any company in the world. Reid’s clients include police forces, private security
companies, the military, the FBI, the CIA, and the Secret Service.”).
139 Gavett, supra note 4; Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 7.
140 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 7.
141 Id.
142 Starr, supra note 78.
143 Id.
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up with minimization that intends to make the crime seem less serious and
occasionally with promises or inducements.144 Maximization techniques
are intended to make a suspect feel hopeless, and the minimization tactics
that follow are supposed to provide the suspect with a moral justification,
making him or her feel that confessing will provide an escape or
leniency.145 Throughout the interrogation, police will also present a theme
to the suspect that theorizes why he or she committed the crime.146 The
theme incorporates a suspect’s background and offers “a moral . . . excuse
for committing the offense.”147 For example, a theme for a suspect who has
told police that he would rob someone at gunpoint when desperate could be
that the suspect committed the crime because of extreme financial
necessity.148 If these steps lead an interrogation subject to confess, the
interrogator then works in conjunction with the subject to ensure that the
admission turns into a written confession, and can provide the subject with
assistance like multiple choice questions to help establish the details.149
Social scientists and legal researchers have found numerous problems
with the Reid Technique. At the outset, studies show that the average
person can detect deception in non-verbal behavioral cues only 54% of the
time, and police perform only marginally better.150
Thus, police
interrogators often proceed in an interrogation with a false presumption of
guilt that can lead the interrogator to treat the suspect aggressively, in turn
increasing the suspect’s anxiety.151 The first reading of a suspect and
interrogators’ initial presumption of guilt allow and encourage the
interrogators to proceed with psychologically coercive tactics that can lead
to false confessions.152
144

Id.
Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 12, 18.
146 Gavett, supra note 4.
147 Brian R. Gallini, Police “Science” in the Interrogation Room: Seventy Years of
Pseudo-Psychological Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible Confessions, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 529, 539–40 (2010).
148 Id.
149 Starr, supra note 78.
150 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6; see also Charles F.
Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgements, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC.
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When interrogation subjects are innocent, their innocence becomes an
additional risk factor that police can undermine with psychologically
coercive tactics. Innocent people tend to be more willing to cooperate
because they believe that truth and justice will ultimately prevail, and that
their innocence will become apparent to investigators and the jury. 153
Further risk factors include intellectual disability, mental illness,
immaturity, youth, failure to understand the legal system, and failure to
understand the potential ramifications of the situation.154
The
psychologically coercive tactics associated with the Reid Technique can
make individuals in these particular groups, as well as any interrogation
subjects who become anxious and broken down by such tactics, feel
powerless, confused, and sometimes doubtful, about their own
innocence.155 Consequently, the Reid Technique may lead to coerced and
false confessions.
III. NEGOTIATION MODELS
Police officers use elements from commonly used negotiation models
when interrogating suspects. These negotiation models provide varied
tactics for addressing conflict and strive to maximize success in legal and
business settings as well as in everyday life. Three of the most commonly
used models are the position-based model, the interest-based model, and the
core concerns model. These models can, and often do, overlap within the
context of a singular negotiation.156 In particular, negotiation scholars
frequently discuss the tension between position-based and interest-based
models, commonly known as the negotiator’s dilemma.157 The dilemma
results from the tension between the cooperative, interest-based negotiation
approach that can build value for all parties and the adversarial, positional
approach that can allow one party to claim value over the other.158 When
faced with this tension, those involved in a negotiation or conflict scenario
must remain cognizant of the tension and assess which elements of a
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(explaining various models for addressing and managing internal and external conflict,
including negotiations, and how these models can interact and overlap).
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particular model are appropriate given the circumstances.159 While each
model offers a unique framework that can help negotiators reach an
understanding of conflict scenarios, such scenarios are often complicated
and involve a plethora of moving parts that rarely perfectly fit or are
explained in totality by a theoretical model. Although these three models
can be used to achieve positive outcomes, such as favorable deals and
conflict resolution, police interrogators using tactics such as the Reid
Technique employ elements from each model to coerce interrogation
subjects to confess. An analysis of each model aids in understanding why
psychologically coercive interrogation techniques are so effective in
eliciting confessions, whether true or false.
The position-based model is an adversarial model that emphasizes
what an individual desires, or at least what he or she says that he or she
desires, or what he or she feels entitled to.160 The chief concern of a
negotiator adhering to this model is gaining more value, as defined by the
context of the negotiation, than the other party and can involve exploitation
of one party’s power over the other to achieve that goal.161
On the other hand, the interest-based model of negotiation focuses on
what the negotiator actually needs and stresses the importance of the goals
or motives that underlie the positions, or stated desires, of each party.162 As
an example from everyday life, two chefs working in a kitchen may both
demand that they need the last orange for a recipe, and their respective
positions would be to claim sole use over the orange.163 However, one chef
might need the orange peel for a garnish, and the other chef might need the
juice of the orange for a dressing. Those reasons would be their interests,
or motivations for demanding the orange in the first place.164 In an interestbased negotiation, the chefs would express this reasoning to each other in
order to reach the mutually beneficial solution of splitting the orange, so the
first chef claims the orange peel and the other chef takes the remainder of
the orange.165 The four tenets of the interest-based model, which seeks to
reach an agreement that respects the interests of both parties, are: (1)
“separat[ing] the people from the problem” and “be[ing] soft on the people
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162 Id.; see also FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 36, at 11–12.
163 Mary Rowe, Nils Fonstad & Robert McKersie, Interests vs. Positions, MIT, http://
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and hard on the problem,” (2) “focus[ing] on interests, not positions,” (3)
“invent[ing] options for mutual gain,” and (4) “insist[ing] on objective
criteria.”166
Last, Fisher and Shapiro developed and discussed the core concerns
model of negotiation in their book Beyond Reason.167 This model
recognizes that an overabundance of emotions is present in a negotiation
and that emotion aids in the parties’ understanding of the situation, while
also providing opportunities for negotiators to address and successfully
navigate conflict scenarios.168 The model identifies five core concerns:
appreciation, autonomy, affiliation, status, and role.169 The level of
importance of a particular concern varies personally and situationally, but
in general, people experience positive emotions if their concerns are met or
have negative feelings if they are not satisfied.170 In turn, people feel
positive emotions when engaging in interest-based negotiation and negative
emotions tend to be linked to the adversarial position-based model.171
Thus, core concerns can also influence parties’ positions and interests.172 In
order to foster positive emotions, Fisher and Shapiro suggest to “‘express
appreciation’, ‘build affiliation’, ‘respect autonomy’, acknowledge status’,
and ‘choose a fulfilling role.’”173
IV. APPLICATION OF NEGOTIATION MODELS TO THE CASE OF
NGA TRUONG
The specific details of Nga Truong’s interrogation are positioned for
an analysis under negotiation frameworks. The position-based model,
interest-based model, and core-concerns model demonstrate how the
detectives, using the Reid Technique, psychologically coerced Truong to
confess to a crime she did not commit. This section additionally highlights
how Detectives Pageau and Doherty could exploit ambiguity in the legal
framework surrounding interrogations to achieve their single-minded goal
of obtaining confession evidence. Further, this application suggests why
Truong confessed despite her innocence.
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A. SPECIFICS OF THE TRUONG INTERROGATION

In their interrogation of Nga Truong, Detectives Pageau and Doherty
generally adhered to the Reid Technique.174 At the outset, Pageau and
Doherty isolated the teenager in a small, windowless room.175 Consistently
throughout the two-hour interrogation, rather than questioning Truong
about Khyle’s death, they assumed that the teenage mother had killed her
baby.176 This presumption was not based on any physical evidence. The
interrogators failed to consider baby Khyle’s history of asthma, his fever,
strep throat, and tracheobronchitis that his death certificate listed as
contributing factors to his death.177 Pageau and Doherty proceeded under
this assumption of guilt, accused Truong of lying any time she suggested
otherwise, and incorporated their assumption into their theme that she had a
history of killing babies.178 The interrogators engaged in maximization
tactics by twisting the evidence regarding the death of Truong’s brother due
to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome eight years prior to suggest that she had
killed him. Detectives Pageau and Doherty then presented false evidence
that the autopsy stated Khyle was smothered, and yelled at the teen and
accused her of failing to tell the truth when she repeatedly stated that she
did not kill her son.179 When Detectives Pageau and Doherty sensed that
Truong was showing signs of hopelessness, they switched to minimization
practices.180 The interrogators knew that Truong was poor, and lived with
and took care of her brothers, and they offered to provide the family with
help in getting into a better home in exchange for her confession.181 The
police additionally advanced the theory that the teen’s mother was also
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Gavett, supra note 4.
Id.
176 Boeri, supra note 2.
177 Id.
178 Boeri, supra note 9; see also Boeri, supra note 2 (Truong: “I’m telling you
everything.” Pageau: “No you’re not. Stop. Don’t lie to me.” . . . Pageau: “Sudden death
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179 Boeri, supra note 2.
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181 Boeri, supra note 9; see also Boeri, supra note 2 (Pageau: “All everyone’s waiting
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blameworthy in the baby’s death182 and suggested that if she confessed, she
would be punished in juvenile court, if at all.183 Shortly thereafter, Truong
admitted and eventually confessed to the crime.184
Similar to many police interrogators who employ coercive tactics,185
Detectives Pageau and Doherty largely remained within the bounds of the
law during their questioning of Truong. It was legal for the interrogators to
question the teenage mother in a small space, yell at her, distort past
evidence about her brother’s death, and lie about Khyle’s autopsy. The
detectives only broke the law when they promised Truong leniency in
juvenile court in exchange for her confession and failed to extend her the
Miranda rights required for juveniles.186 This interrogation provides an
opportunity to apply the position-based, interest-based, and core concerns
models of negotiation to a coercive police interrogation that led to a false
confession.
B. NEGOTIATION MODELS APPLIED TO THE INTERROGATORS

Before Truong’s interrogation began, the Worcester police lacked any
evidence against the teen.187 Given that the case involved the death of a
baby, Detectives Pageau and Doherty likely felt significant pressure to
obtain the valuable evidence of a confession.188 While police interrogators
often do not maliciously intend to elicit false confessions or convict people
for crimes that they did not commit,189 interrogators’ “single-minded
purpose” in an interrogation is to obtain evidence, preferably in the form of
a confession, that will lead to a conviction.190 Thus, under the positionbased model, police will use coercive tactics and exploit their inherent
power over suspects to meet their position of securing a confession.191

182 Gavett, supra note 4 (Pageau and Doherty implied that the teenage mother committed
the murder because taking care of her siblings had become frustrating and too much of a
burden).
183 Boeri, supra note 9.
184 Id.
185 Gavett, supra note 4 (Richard Leo explaining, “Most of what police do in
interrogations that lead to false confessions is legal. The accusations, yelling; moving in
closer, invading one’s space; lying about evidence, making it up, pretending to have
evidence; telling somebody they failed a polygraph, for example.”).
186 Boeri, supra note 2.
187 Boeri, supra note 9.
188 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 13–14.
189 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 81, at 983.
190 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6.
191 See Riskin, supra note 156, at 30–31.
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A possible interest for detectives like Pageau and Doherty is the desire
to feel that they are of value to their departments by gaining this evidence.
Detectives are often encouraged by departments that reward effective
interrogators with awards and promotions.192 These interests underlie and
motivate interrogators’ position of securing confession evidence.
Last, the core concerns that appear to be most significant to police
interrogators like Pageau and Doherty are appreciation, status, and role.193
If officers successfully obtain confessions, police superiors, the media, and
the public may all express appreciation to the officers and recognize their
status as effective interrogators.194 These officers will then feel fulfilled in
their role in the police department by getting a conviction for a suspect.
This examination under the negotiation models demonstrates that the
single-minded position of obtaining a confession—particularly in high
stakes cases where evidence is lacking—combined with the interests and
core concerns that encourage police to achieve this position can lead
interrogators to employ any means necessary to secure confessions. In turn,
this can result in the proliferation of coercive tactics that lead to false
confessions and can detract from determining the truth and a commitment
to justice.
C. NEGOTIATION MODELS APPLIED TO NGA TRUONG

On the other side of the interrogation, Truong presented several of the
risk factors mentioned in Part II.195 Her age, lack of exposure and
understanding of the legal system and interrogation practices, and
emotional state due to her son’s death one day earlier, coupled with the
deceptive tactics of the interrogators, made her more susceptible to the
coercion that ultimately resulted in a confession of guilt for her son’s
death.196 An examination of the interrogation under the negotiation model
framework from Truong’s perspective further illustrates why the teenage
192

See id.; see, e.g., Macaraeg & Kunichoff, supra note 1 (discussing awards and
promotions granted to police interrogators in the Burge torture scandal).
193 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 15.
194 See, e.g., David Boeri, Questions Remain In Coerced Worcester Confession, WBUR
(Feb. 16, 2012), http://legacy.wbur.org/2012/02/16/worcester-police [https://perma.cc/
NYT9-AL5Y] (Gemme stating that even after Truong’s case was dropped, he stands by his
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Croteau, Civil Rights Suit Filed Against Worcester Police, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Dec. 4,
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B8-LGVF] (Worcester Police Chief Gary J. Gemme stating that the interrogation was valid
and that the police department’s practices were constitutional).
195 See supra, Section II (B).
196 Gavett, supra note 4.
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mother gave into the coercion and confessed. The position of Truong and
others in similar interrogation situations is to retain their innocence and
avoid being convicted of the crime alleged against them.197 However, as
the interrogation progresses and police employ techniques that exploit
interrogation subjects’ interests, it can become difficult for subjects to keep
this ultimate goal in mind, and subjects can become tempted to give in to
their interests that offer any form of escape.198 In this case, the
interrogators’ coercive tactics exploited Truong’s interest in helping her
family and getting out of the hopeless interrogation situation.
Further, applying the framework of core concerns, Pageau and
Doherty built affiliation with the teen by showing sympathy for her
situation through their minimization practices and recognition of her status
as the caretaker for her brothers.199 This, in turn, likely made Truong feel
appreciated for caring for her family. Under the frameworks of the
negotiation models, this demonstrates that interrogators can leverage their
power and utilize coercive tactics to exploit suspects’ interests and core
concerns to alter their positions, leading to a result that is in line with the
interrogators’ positions, interests, and core concerns.
CONCLUSION
A. AFTERMATH OF NGA TRUONG’S CASE

In 2016, the City of Worcester reached a settlement with Nga Truong
for $2.1 million in the aftermath of the false confession.200 Following her
release from jail, Truong enrolled in college and is now living as a free
woman.201 However, after the case ended, the policemen responsible for
her interrogation “continue[d] to perform their duties as investigators with
the full support and confidence of the police administration.”202 The
Worcester Police Department actually promoted Pageau to investigate
police misconduct.203 Worcester Police Chief Gary Gemme further
confirmed that he “expressed full support and confidence in [his] two
officers.”204 The police department’s only other institutional response was
to agree that the district attorney would be involved in all of its
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
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Boeri, supra note 194.
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Boeri, supra note 194.
Id.

98

JANZEN

[Vol. 109

investigations of homicides and serious crimes.205 Ed Ryan, Truong’s
lawyer in the case and former Massachusetts Bar Association president,
commented on the lack of police accountability and tolerance for the
continuance of coercive interrogation tactics. He explained that “[t]his is a
degree of arrogance, a degree of disrespect for the rule of law that frightens
me . . . That is a very frightening circumstance to have law enforcement so
empowered, so arrogant, that they think they can get away with this kind of
behavior.”206 Ryan further stated that Truong’s case was “the worst case of
coercion he’s seen in thirty-five years.”207
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CROSS-INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Psychologically coercive tactics like those used by the police
interrogators in Truong’s case can and do elicit truthful confessions that
lead to the proper administration of justice, but they also frequently elicit
false confessions.208 Given the significant weight that the public, as well as
those in the legal field, assign to confession evidence, these confessions can
create injustices throughout the legal process and lead to convictions and
jail time for innocent people. Further, false confessions and wrongful
convictions mean that the true perpetrators of crimes may remain free with
the potential to commit further harm.
False confessions also place a financial toll on taxpayers.209 In the
past few years, judges in cities across the country have awarded settlements
ranging from a few million dollars to tens of millions of dollars to
individuals like Truong who were coerced into falsely confessing. 210
Settlements related to false confessions significantly contribute to bills
totaling hundreds of millions of dollars that cities are paying for police
misconduct.211 For example, the state of Illinois paid about $253 million in
taxpayer-backed settlements in wrongful conviction cases between 1989
and early 2013, many of which involved false confessions.212 Taxpayers
205
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are consequently forced to pay the price for police interrogators’ use of
psychologically coercive tactics, while the interrogators themselves largely
remain unpunished.
To address the issue of unreliable confessions as well as the issue of
financial drain that stems from the larger issue and is illustrated by
Truong’s case, lawmakers and judges, as well as police departments and
individual officers, must commit to systemic changes. Lawmakers can
adopt legislation, like the laws some states have adopted that require police
to electronically record interrogations.213 Legislation of this nature will set
standards for other elements of interrogations, such as presentation of
evidence, offers to provide help, and psychological manipulation and
coercion in general. Further, when presented with evidence of confessions
elicited via coercive tactics, courts can take the opportunity, much like the
Court did when it related to physical torture tactics in Brown,214 to
explicitly prohibit evidence elicited from psychologically coercive
interrogation tactics.
Finally, police departments can update their
interrogation procedures and implement and enforce policies that hold
officers accountable when they engage in coercive practices. This crossinstitutional approach to reform will help to decrease the number of coerced
and false confessions, and in turn, will aid in the administration of true
justice.
While the United States’ interrogation jurisprudence made a step in the
right direction by outlawing third-degree tactics,215 and lawmakers have
furthered progress by introducing electronic recording requirements for
interrogations in some states,216 there exists significant room for
improvement when it comes to psychologically coercive techniques. The
laws currently in place, in addition to police departments’ failure to hold
officers accountable for engagement in improper, and sometimes illegal,
interrogation tactics, encourages the perpetuation of coerced, false
confessions. Under the Reid Technique, police interrogators are trained to
employ psychologically coercive tactics and police departments often
reward officers for securing confessions, whether psychologically coerced
or not. Research demonstrates that these tactics are just as coercive as the

which involved false confessions, cost taxpayers in California at least $221 million between
1989 and 2012).
213 See Dep’t of Justice, New Department Policy Concerning Electronic Recording of
Statements, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1552, 1553 (2015).
214 See 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
215 Id.
216 Dep’t of Justice, supra note 213, 1552 n. 1 (noting Alaska, Arkansas, California, and
twenty other jurisdictions that require officers to electronically record interrogations).
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physical torture associated with the third-degree methods. The law should
thus be updated to reflect that. Like electronic recording laws, legislators
can continue to address this issue by developing laws that regulate other
aspects of interrogations, such as the type and size of room where the
questioning takes place, the kinds of questions that interrogators can and
cannot ask, and the evidence (whether real or fake) that officers can
introduce.
Courts that hear cases involving false confessions can begin to
establish precedent prohibiting psychologically coercive interrogation
methods, such as the Reid Technique. Similar to Judge Kenton-Walker’s
approach in Truong’s case, judges can take into consideration the coercive
influence of some of the legally ambiguous interrogation tactics and deem
confessions inadmissible when the tactics have an unjust coercive impact
on a subject. Prosecutors can further explicitly prohibit interrogators’ use
of any tactics that violate existing laws and can increase enforcement in this
realm. Additionally, as mentioned in the Introduction, courts in recent
years have begun to award individuals coerced into confessing millions of
dollars in settlements with cities and police departments.217 If the judicial
system continues with this practice, this will provide further incentive for
police departments to adopt policies and practices that promote the proper
administration of justice, rather than those that encourage tactics that are
psychologically coercive to obtain confessions at any cost.
The current police systems that tolerate and encourage such practices
via awards and promotions should be overhauled.
Analysis of
psychologically coercive interrogation practices under the frameworks of
the position-based, interest-based, and core concerns models of negotiation
illustrates how these tactics can coerce individuals into confessing to
crimes. Interrogators exploit suspects’ positions, interests, and core
concerns with a single-minded focus of obtaining confessions to enhance
the interrogators’ own positions, interests, and core concerns. This
examination further demonstrates that police interrogators’ hyper-focus on
obtaining confessions impedes the search for truth and justice in numerous
instances by eliciting false confessions. While it is important to gather
solid, reliable evidence in cases, the positions of interrogators should shift
to focus on the proper administration of justice. States and localities are
also financially incentivized to encourage police departments to change
their focus and update their policies given the massive settlements and
damages payments that courts are issuing to individuals that interrogators
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are coercing.218 Departments should reform their interrogation practices
with these positions as a guide, rather than continue with methods found to
be psychologically coercive and unjust. Current policies fail to deter police
interrogators from using psychologically coercive tactics, and there should
be more repercussions when police elicit false confessions. Departments
should thus additionally replace any practices that offer incentives to
officers involved in interrogations that judges deem to be psychologically
coerced with measures that punish and hold officers accountable for such
conduct. Following the negotiation model framework, this policy and
practice update will also aid in shifting police interrogators’ interests and
core concerns to ultimately encourage the position of striving for the proper
administration of justice.
The cross-institutional systemic reform outlined above, informed by
insights from common negotiation models, can help to address the issue of
psychologically coercive interrogation tactics, which are largely permitted
by the current legal framework surrounding interrogations and are
encouraged by police departments. These tactics employ psychological
manipulation and deceit to coerce interrogation subjects into confessing,
and as seen in the case of Nga Truong, can lead individuals to confess to
crimes that they did not commit. Updates to interrogation legislation and
reform of police departments’ interrogation practices will improve the
reliability of confession evidence and will decrease the financial drain that
false confessions impose on taxpayers. In the end, these psychologically
coercive tactics must be prohibited so that no interrogation subject has a
coerced fate.
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